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ABSTRACT: The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s 
(2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent 
their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-
madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the 
catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the 
path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's (1975) framework of First Degree 
Entailment. Cotnoir (2015) has argued that the lattices of Priest and Garfield cannot ground 
the logic of the catuskoti. The concern is simple: on the one hand, FDE brings with it the 
failure of classical principles such as modus ponens. On the other hand, we frequently 
encounter Nāgārjuna using classical principles in other arguments in the MMK. There is a 
problem of validity.  If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, he is facing what is commonly 
called the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases where classical principles 
like modus pones are valid? One cannot just add principles like modus pones as assumptions, 
because in the background paraconsistent logic this does not rule out their negations. In this 
essay, I shall explore and critically evaluate Cotnoir’s proposal. In detail, I shall reveal that 
his framework suffers collapse of the kotis. Taking Cotnoir’s concerns seriously, I shall 
suggest a formulation of the catuskoti in classical Boolean Algebra, extended by the notion of 
an external negation as an illocutionary act. I will focus on purely formal considerations, 
leaving doctrinal matters to the scholarly discourse – as far as this is possible. 
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1. THE FOUR CORNERS 
 
Everything is real and is not real,   
Both real and not real,      
Neither real nor not real. 	
  This is Lord Buddha’s teaching.  
(MMK XVIII:8) 
________________________ 
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The argument in (MMK XVIII:8) above goes under the name catuṣkoṭi1 (Sanskrit; 
चत$ुको'ट). It has found its most prominent use in the Madhyamika school2 of Buddhism 
and the writings of Nāgārjuna 3 , and his Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (henceforth: 
MMK). Here is why the catuskoti is enigmatic to contemporary (academic) logic: in 
the West, following Aristoteles’s logic, we encounter the principle of tertium non 
datur: everything is either true, or false – c’est tout. The catuskoti inflates (while 
denying) this principle to a quintum non datur: It sates four exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive possibilities for any proposition: (1) either it holds, (2) it does not hold, (3) 
it both holds and does not hold, (4) it neither holds nor does not hold – those are the 
four kotis (which roughly translates as "corners"). A model for the catuskoti has to 
maintain the mutual exclusivity and exhaustive nature of the kotis – call this the 
exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint. The reason is twofold: (1) we want to be 
charitable to the logical abilities to the authors who were using the catuskoti, and (2) 
is the way the (negative) catuskoti is commonly employed as an argument, supposed 
to undermine all possible ways a predicate can be attributed to something needs the 
four kotis to exhaust the logical space, which they can only do if they are mutually 
exclusive. This argument, which is a kind of reductio argument to reveal the 
deficiency of the concept in question is called a prasanga argument. The concepts the 
MMK is dealing with are causation, motion, self, identity and others. In MMK 
XVIII:8, specifically, the thesis is that ‘everything’ is ‘real’. The four kotis are 
supposed to exhaust all of the logical space and to state every possible way “reality” 
can be attributed to the object which is “everything”. Hence, the argument sees the 
anti-thesis that ‘everything’ is not real, the conjunction of thesis and anti-thesis, and 
the disjunction of thesis and anti-thesis. As Priest (2010) says:  
 
“The central concern of the MMK is to establish that everything is empty of self-
existence (svabhava), and the ramifications of this fact. The main part of the work 
consists of a series of chapters which aim to establish, of all the things which one might 
plausibly take to have svabhava (causes, the self, suffering, etc.), that they do not do so.” 
Priest (2010) 
   
  To do that, every possible way something can be has to be ruled out eventually to 
illuminate their emptiness of self-existence. The “quadruple-wise” exclusivity of the 
kotis comes as a natural consequence of wanting to establish the exhaustivity of the 
kotis. Only if none of the kotis is equivalent to the other kotis, only if every koti 
establishes a distinct possibility, the logical space can be exhausted.  
                                                
1 For what follows, I will deprive myself of the diacritical of an adequate translation from Sanskrit and 
write ‘catuskoti’ instead. 
2 Although, as I argue in a forthcoming article, it is neither limited to Madhyamaka, nor the Indian 
philosophical milieu. Just like most concepts of Buddhist thinking it has its origins in Hindu texts (or a 
criticism thereof) and has developed as Buddhism found its way to the East. 
3 For a general introduction to the thinking of Nagarjuna and the history of Buddhist metaphysics and 
the catuskoti, see Priest (forthcoming). 
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   Let us give a very straight forward model of the catuskoti to see the deficiency of 
classical logic in this context: 
 
Positive Catuskoti 1 				#  2 				¬$  3 				# ∧ ¬#  4 				¬(% ∨ ¬%)  
 
To make sense of it with the tools of (classical) modern western logic, we first have 
to drop ("#;	¬¬'	 ⊣⊢ ')  , i.e. the Principle of Double Negation. If we would not 
drop DN, koti (3) and koti (4) would collapse, since by De Morgan’s Law they are 
equivalent. Even if they would not collapse, the third koti would still entail both koti 
(1) and koti (2) – this contradicts their mutual exclusivity.  
  In Westerhoff's (2009: 4) attempt to rescue the status of classical logic concerning 
the catuskoti, we find a different type of negation for koti (4), such that koti (3) is no 
more deducible from (4). He notes that Indian logic (sometimes) distinguishes 
internal (prayudāsa) from external (prasaja) negation4. Historically, the distinction is 
grammatical; the prasaja-negation negates the verb (as in brāhmana nasti, “This is 
not Brahmin”), the prayudāsa-negation connects with the noun-phrase (as in 
abrāhmana asti – “This is a Non-brahmin”). Let us reflect this semantics with a 
distinction between external and internal negation: whereas the internal negation in 
any proposition implies the existence of another but different proposition, the external 
negation does not. The negation in “This bird is not a crane (i.e. a non-crane)” is 
internal, it implies that the object (the bird) exists, but that it is some other species 
than a crane, i.e. that the predicate (“crane”) does not apply to the object (bird). An 
external negation of the proposition would say “It is not the case that (this bird is a 
crane)” – hence, there is no implicature to the existence of anything whatsoever. 
  Note that every proposition with an internal negation implies the denial of the 
state-of-affairs in question, but not vice versa. From the fact that there is something 
that has “bird-ness” but not “crane-ness” in this particular region of space-time under 
consideration, we can infer that there is nothing that has both “bird-ness” and “crane-
ness”. But from that fact that there is nothing that has both “bird-ness” and “crane-
ness”, we cannot infer that there is such a thing that has “bird-ness” but no “crane-
ness” since there might be nothing that has “bird-ness”, or even nothing at all. 
Westerhoff applies this distinction to koti (4), arguing that the negation before the 
parentheses is to be read externally, while the negations in koti (2) and (3) are not. 
Priest (2010) argues that the negation-move is somewhat ad hoc, and while it holds 
for kotis (1-3), it cannot hold for koti (4). In any way, it seems arbitrary to distinguish 
                                                
4 In modern discussions on category mistakes, we find a distinction into choice negation and exclusion 
negation. This reflects the ancient idea of prayudasa/prasaja. See Routley (1969) as prominent 
example. 
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between different negations within the catuskoti, if there is no textual evidence for it. 
I will pick up the discussion in §6 again.  
   Besides that, the catuskoti contradicts both ("#$; 	' ∨ ¬'  ), i.e. the Law of the 
Excluded Middle, and ("#$;	¬ ( ∧ ¬( )  , i.e. the Law of Non-Contradiction. We 
can thus, without being overly reckless, say that the tools of classical logic are 
slightly limited when consulted to formulate an adequate model of the catuskoti. It is 
often seen as a last resort to appeal to non-classical logics in which LEM and LNC 
are not valid, but the catuskoti suggests it. A formal logical system in which the 
validity of ("#$; 	', ¬'	 ⊢ +)  , i.e. The Principle of Explosion is denied is, in modern 
logical terms, paraconsistent. The simplest paraconsistent logic is LP. What to make 
of koti (1) and koti (2) in light of a paraconsistent logic is an open question: how can 
we express the classical “just true” and “just false”?5 This question will also be 
picked up here and there throughout this essay. A formal logical system in which 
(LEM) is dropped is, in modern logical terms, paracomplete. K3, is arguably the 
simplest paracomplete logic6. 
 
2. THE GARFIELD/PRIEST INTERPRETATION 
 
In the search for an adequate model for the catuskoti Priest (2010) introduces a set of 
status-predicates and gives an interpretation of those, using a four-valued semantics. 
He expresses the four kotis with a set of status-predicates: ! = {$, &, ', (}  , which 
evaluate the semantic status of a proposition on a meta-level. Let !  be the truth-
predicate “is true”, !  is “is false”, !  is “both true and false”, !  is “neither true nor 
false”. ! "   is the proposition “A is true”, where !   is a name for !.  To define !,#  
Priest first defines !  as ! " = 	% ¬" .  Here is how we define the four kotis: 
 1) ! " = 	! " ∧ ¬'(")	  2) ! " = 	¬& " ∧ ! "   3) ! " = 	% " ∧ ' "   4) ! " =	¬&(") ∧ ¬*(")  
 
Taking the exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint into account, the catuskoti can be 
expressed in the following way: 
 !"#$%&'#( + : + , ∨ . , ∨ / , ∨ 0 ,   !"#$%&'(')*	,-.&)/0'.): ¬(41 6 ∧ 42 6 )  
 
                                                
5 For a recent strategy on how to articulate the “just true/just false” in a paraconsitent logic, termed 
‘shrieking’, see Beall (2013) and a response in Scharp (2018). Note that the ‘just-true’ problem is 
merely one instance of the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases, where the 
inconsistency of A and its negation is assumed? 
6 For an introduction to both, see Priest (2001). 
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The positive catuskoti can be represented by a four-valued lattice in Anderson and 
Belnap's (1975) logic of First Degree Entailment (FDE). The logic is a sort of 
combination of the two well-known three-valued logics LP and K3. By assigning a 
truth value to all the sentences of the language in which the catuskoti is formulated 
via an interpretation function !  , such that ! " 	$	{&, (, ), *}  , we generate a semantics 
for the logic. Let the four kotis be represented by this Hasse-Diagram. 
 
 
TABLE 1: The positive catuskoti 
 
  The behaviour of the standard connectives is defined like this: 
 
 The value of disjunction, ! 	# ∨ %   , is the least upper bound of !(#)  and ! 	#   .
The value of the conjunction, ! 	# ∧ % ,  is the greatest lower bound of !(#)  and  ! 	#   .
  The value of negation, !	(¬%)  otherwise toggles !	#$%	&  but maps {", $}  to itself. 
 
 To define validity in many-valued logic, we need to elaborate on the notion of 
designated value - the values that are preserved in valid arguments. 
 
 The set of designated values is ! =	 $, &   
 
Call Priest’s logic for the catuskoti FDE(S), where the S stands for the set of status-
predicates.  
 
If the value of A is designated, ! "   is also designated. If the value of A is not 
in	"  , the value of ! " = $  
 
If A takes some value, the statement to the effect that it takes that value is designated. 
This can be seen by following the diagonal, top left to bottom right on the diagram 
below.  
 
A
  T ⟨A⟩  B ⟨A⟩  F ⟨A⟩  N ⟨A⟩  
t  t or b  f  f  f or b  
b  b or f  t or b  b or f  f or b  
f  f  f  t or b  f or b  
n  f  f  f  t  
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These truth conditions validate the formal statements of the catuskoti and meet the 
exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint. Consider the formulation if the catuskoti with 
status-predicates: !"#$%&'#( + : + , ∨ . , ∨ / , ∨ 0 ,   . Whatever value a 
proposition takes, that value will be designated (t or b), and hence will be the 
disjunction. Considering the !"#$%&'(')*	,-.&)/0'.)  : Any statement of the form !1 # ∧ !2 #    will contain a sub-conjunction of the form ! " ∧ !¬ " 	&'	( " ∧ ¬((")  . So, ¬(#1 % ∧ #2 % )   is equivalent to a 
disjunction which has a part of the form ! " ∨ !¬ "   . Either !  is designated, and 
so is the first disjuncts, or !   is not designated but then the second disjuncts is. 
Therefore, the whole disjunction is designated.  
  Considering the	"#ℎ%&'()*)(+	,-.'(/%).(,   FDE(S) avoids the collapse of the 
kotis: (4) ¬" # ∧ ¬% #   does not collapse into (3) ! " ∧ $ "   in FDE(S). To say 
that ¬ " # ∨ % #   is to say, that A is neither true nor false, to say that ! " ∧ $ "   , is to say that !  is both true and false – two very different things. The 
status-predicates avoid the collapse. It does not collapse, since the biconditional in 
FDE(S), just as in LP is not contrapossible. We don’t have ¬" # 	→ "¬(#)  . This 
will be made more precise later on, when I give the collapse argument against 
Cotnoir’s logic for the catuskoti. 
   A prominent characteristic of the Garfield/Priest interpretation is that it employs a 
metaphysical distinction that is commonly found in the Madhyamika. Reality is a 
twofold concept that displays itself through ‘conventional reality’ (samvrti-satya) and 
‘ultimate reality’ (paramarthra-satya). It describes the world of appearances. This 
includes material objects, properties, causation, the self, feelings, memories, 
individuality, identity (etc.), and the erroneous idea that all those things have 
svahbava. Furthermore, it is the realm of thought, language, and most probably, logic. 
Nāgārjuna says that claims about conventional reality have all four truth-values of the 
catuskoti. What to make of that, and whether Nagarjuna, by saying that, is proposing 
a position on its own is part of the contemporary discourse7. Rejecting all four kotis is 
sometimes called the ‘fourfold negation’. There is a corresponding negative catuskoti. 
 
Negative Catuskoti 1 				¬$  2 				¬(¬%)  3 				¬(% ∧ ¬%)  4 				¬(¬ % ∨ ¬% )  
 
In Priest (2010) we see the negation as a fifth possibility, resulting in a five-valued 
logic, where the fifth value (e), which stands for emptiness, is the denial of the other 
four values. One might wonder whether this threatens the exhaustivity of the kotis on 
the outset? Indeed, it does when one operates on the level of conventional reality 
only. One has to bear in mind that the fifth value corresponds to the ultimate reality, 
the four kotis hence exhaust the logical space of the conventional reality, whereas the 
                                                
7 See, again, Westerhoff (2007, 2009) or Kreutz (forthcoming). 
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fifth values exhausts the logical space of the ultimate reality. This is the reason why 
the pairwise exclusivity of the kotis isn’t threatened either. The designated values 
remain !, # ,	  since (e) expresses that a claim should neither be accepted nor denied. 
It can, therefore, not be designated. For more on the semantics of the negative 
catuskoti, please see Priest (2010). 
 !"#$%&'#( - : + , ∨ . , ∨ / , ∨ 0 , ∨ 1  
 
The negative catuskoti emphasises the view that ultimate reality is essentially 
ineffable. Claims about ultimate reality are ineffable since ultimate reality is 
inaccessible from the standpoint of conventional reality, and since our language is a 
language of conventional reality, truth about the fundamental reality cannot be 
expressed with the vocabulary of conventional language. They are asserted only for 
the purpose of designation. The ‘Four Extremes’ (Sanskrit; चतरु*त) is a particular 
application of the logical form of the catuskoti to a metaphysical thesis. 
Garfield/Priest suggest a fifth truth-value (e) which has none of the four truth values 
and is the denial of all the kotis. 
 
 The Four Extremes, The Fifth Value 
1) Being8 
2) Non-Being 
3) Being and Non-Being 
4) Neither Being, nor Non-Being 
5) None of the above (e) 
 
By disproving all conceivable possibilities with (e), Nāgārjuna traces the middle path 
between being and non-being. Adding (e), makes our logic five-valued, where the 
fifth value is supposed to be incompatible with the other four. Call the resulting logic 
FDEe. 
 
 
TABLE 2: The negative catuskoti 
 
                                                
8 The technical term for ‘being’ in Buddhist literature is ‘dharma’, the bare phenomena of the world. 
The truth-value (e) corresponds to the view that everything is empty ‘sunya’, empty of essence, or self-
existence ‘svahbava’. For more information about those terms, see Westerhoff (2007), or Priest 
(forthcoming). 
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But how do we proceed in our logical analysis now? How can a sentence expressed in 
conventional reality receive the value (e)? Priest suggests a new valuation function !  ,
which maps all values in the set {", $, %, &}   to (e), such that !(# $ = &  , then !(# ¬% = 	! # % ∧ )	 = 	! # % ∨ )	 ) = ,.   The new truth-value should not be 
designated. It neither tells us to accept the status of the other claims nor their 
negations, and can therefore not be designated. If it were designated, the negative 
catuskoti would represent a trivialism. Priest (2010) holds this to be untenable. The 
connectives for (e) will put out (e) in every instance, the arrows in TABLE 2 shall 
represent this. The negation of (e) is of course (e).  
  The bearer of (e) has to be reconceptualised. We are no more talking about 
statements, such as the positive catuskoti does, we are talking about states-of-affairs. 
Whereas the positive catuskoti is talking about statements made in and about 
conventional reality, the negative catuskoti is talking about ultimate reality itself. 
Whereas we had a semantic thesis with the positive catuskoti, we now have a 
metaphysical thesis. 
  Reading Nāgārjuna through the lens of Zen teaching, Garfield/Priest say that 
realizing that the distinction between fundamental reality and ultimate reality is itself 
merely conventional corresponds to the process of enlightenment. One becomes 
enlightened once one realizes that the conventional reality fails to exist ultimately. 
But not only that. One has to realize that the emptiness of ultimate reality is itself 
empty – the reflective arrow in TABLE 3 shall represent this. Call it “the emptiness 
of emptiness”. 
 
 
TABLE 3: The emptiness of emptiness 
 
For the phenomena to exist at all, is for them to be empty of inherent existence. 
Realizing their emptiness is realizing their existence. From this point, one can jump 
into the abyss of enlightenment, knowing that reality will not bottom out, as the Zen 
Teachers would say. The soteriological end-goal of enlightenment is therefore not the 
extinction of self and the reality, as the negative catuskoti might suggest, it rather lies 
in the achievement of a deep understanding of the inherent nature of reality – which is 
emptiness. Archiving this understanding does not change the world of appearance, 
but arguably the appearance of the world. Once awakened, the usefulness of the 
negative catuskoti vanishes, and so ! = 0  , i.e. it stops mapping all the values in the 
set {", $, %, &}  to (e), the set {", $, %, &}  , which represents conventional reality remains. 
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TABLE 4: Awakening 
 
Although, as I argue in Kreutz (forthcoming), I take the systematics described by 
Garfield/Priest as an adequate conceptual model for the path towards enlightenment, 
as described in Chan/Zen, and especially the jūgyūzu (Jap. 十牛図, Eng. Ten Ox 
Herding Pictures). I can see no trace of it in Nagarjuna. As the discussion is, in this 
context at least, limited to Nagarjuna's use of the catuskoti, I find it hard to accept the 
story around the negative catuskoti. As far as I am aware, it is predominantly the 
prasanga-argument which employs the negative catuskoti, and it is that way in which 
the negative catuskoti is used in Nagarjuna.  
 
3. VALIDITY AND FDE 
 
Even if Priest is right in modelling the catuskoti and the process of awakening with 
FDE(S) and FDEe, several difficulties appear. It is well known that several classical 
principles, such as modus ponens, modus tollens and hypothetical syllogism fail in 
FDE. Hence, they also fail in the Garfield/Priest logic for the catuskoti. Yet, as 
Cotnoir points out, Nāgārjuna regularly employs the above-mentioned inferences in 
the MMK9. To give you one apparent example of a modus ponens in MMK: 
 !"#$%	'"()(%:	+ ⊃ -, + ⊨ -	   
  When there is change, there is motion. Since there is change in the moving,   motion is in 
that which is moving. (MMK 2.2)  
 
Since the material conditional is a hidden disjunction (by definition, 	" # ⊃ % = "(¬# ∨ %)  ), there is a counterexample to it in FDE: take ! " = 	%  and ! " = 	%.	   Remember, ! = #, % .	  The second premise is designated, since ! " = 	%  . What about the first premise? Negation does not toggle !,  so ! ¬# = 	&  .
The way that disjunction is defined, the least upper bound of !	  and !   is !,	  thus ! ¬# ∨ % = '  . Since ! " ⊃ $ = !(¬" ∨ $)  ), the first premise '" # ⊃ % '  is also 
designated. By stipulation, ! " = 	%  , and is thus undesignated. Hence, we have 
designated premises, but an undesignated conclusion. Modus ponens fails. 
                                                
9 For present purposes, it will suffice to give the counterexample to one of the classical principles only. 
For the other counterexamples, see Cotnoir (2015). 
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  Similar counterexamples can be found for modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism 
and hypothetical syllogism, and similar instances of Nāgārjuna employing them in the 
MMK can be found as well. The Garfield/Priest interpretation has a serious problem. 
If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, those arguments are invalid. There are (at 
least) two ways to handle this problem: find a paraconsistent and paracomplete logic 
that recaptures the classical principles, or find a classical logic which meets the 
exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint10. One thing is certain: FDE, as it is, is too weak to 
be a genuine logic for the MMK.  
 
4. COTNOIR'S SOLUTION TO THE RECAPTURE PROBLEM 
 
Cotnoir’s proposal on how to accommodate the weakness of FDE is upfront. He takes 
his inspiration from suggestions in Deguchi, Priest and Garfield (2008) who 
understand the positive catuskoti as a tool, supposed to undermine the conventional 
reality, not as a characterization of the ontological status of the conventional 
perspective itself. On their reading, contradictions applied to conventional reality are 
merely prima facie11.  
    Cotnoir goes on to disambiguate the contradictions between the conventional and 
the ultimate perspectives. He suggests that the positive catuskoti blends both 
perspectives, so that contradictions on the conventional level dissolve. He introduces 
an alternative lattice which is still four-valued. He also retains !, # 	  as designated 
values. The mayor difference is that it is formulated in plain Boolean Algebra, with 
the result that the crucial classical principles are accommodated. In detail, he takes 
the truth-values to be ordered pairs such that both perspectives are represented in the 
truth-value. The first member of the pair answers “is it conventionally true?” with 
affirmation ‘1’ or denial ‘0’, the second answers “is it ultimately false?” with 
affirmation ‘1’ or denial ‘0’. With this, he re-produces the four corners of the 
catuskoti. The possibilities are: (1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0). One example: (1,1) means 
conventionally true, and ultimately false. Disjunction and conjunction are invariably 
defined as least upper bound and greatest lower bound. One difference is that 
negation toggles not only (0,1) and (1,0), but also (1,1) and (0,0). The semantics for 
negation thus denies the possibility of contradictions on the conventional level. Since 
Cotnoir retains ! = #, %   , (1,1) and (1,0) are designated. Validity (⊨B4) is defined in 
                                                
10 One could of course think of Nagarjuna as a logical pluralist who is using one logic hear, and 
another logic there. A problem with this approach is the fact that Nagarjuna (as did all the other 
philosophers of his time an area) did not use any logic at all. What, I guess, motivates Cotnoir's point 
here is that we, again, want to be charitable to Nagarjuna's logical abilities. We can guess that he 
would have realised that his way to formulate arguments, especially the prasanga on the one side, and 
the modus-ponens on the other, do not go together.   
11 For this proposal to work, eventually, we need to establish a connection between the four kotis (i.e. 
stating all the ways something could be), and an undermining of conventional reality. It looks like, 
stating things as they are, on its own, is not enough to establish anything like an undermining of 
conventional reality. As I argue in Kreutz (forthcoming), there is no logical connection between the 
kotis and what Cotnoir would describe as the undermining of conventional reality, which, argumentum 
e contrario, is the establishing of absolute reality. 
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the usual designation-preserving way. The semantics generates are purely classical 
propositional logic – a four-valued Boolean Algebra (call it: B4). It validates all the 
classical principles that FDE is too weak to validate12.  
 
 
TABLE 5: Cotnoir’s Lattice 
 
This interpretation of the catuskoti, which is suggested in Garfield and Priest (2003) 
and Garfield (1995) relies on the Tibetan teacher Tsongkhapa’s (1357-1419) reading 
of the catuskoti, who excessively engaged with the ultimate/conventional distinction. 
Considering MMK XVIII:8,  
 
Everything is real [conventionally] and is not real [ultimately].  
Both real [conventionally] and not real [ultimately],  
Neither real [ultimately] nor not real [conventionally].  
This is Lord Buddha’s teaching.  
 
See how Tillemann (1997) comments on this interpretation: 
 
Indisputably, Tsong kha pa’s interpretation offers advantages in terms of its logical 
clarity, but as an exegesis of Madhyamaka, his approach may seem somewhat inelegant, 
since it obliges us to add words almost everywhere in Madhyamaka texts. Remarkably, 
Tsong kha pa himself accomplishes this project down to its most minute details in his 
commentary on the Madhyamakakarikas—perhaps at the price of sacrificing the 
simplicity of Nagarjuna’s language. Hence, is there a more elegant interpretation of the 
tetralemma...? 
 
The same applies to Cotnoir’s proposal.  It offers a certain logical clarity on the cost 
of metaphysical confusion. Throwing the ultimate and conventional perspective 
together takes away the initial appeal to different levels of reality and dilutes the 
distinction into positive and negative catuskoti.  
  Furthermore, and most importantly, what looks like the perfect logic for 
Nāgārjuna cannot account for the negative catuskoti, used as a prasanga argument. 
As this is the predominant role of the catuskoti within the MMK, I take Cotnoir's 
proposal to be misguided (with respect to the MMK) To see that, remember that the 
B4-semantics implies that no proposition and its negation can both be ultimately not-
false. But from the ultimate perspective, the catuskoti says that being true is not the 
                                                
12 Also, the “just-true problem” is solved, since truth is conventionally identical to un-falsity, and 
falsity to un-truth. 
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same as being not-false. As Cotnoir acknowledges, the B4-semantics is useful only 
for the positive catuskoti. It is still FDE(e) that is the adequate logic for the negative 
catuskoti, but that again suffers from the recapture problem. 
 
5. WHY COTNOIR'S PROPOSAL FAILS 
 
I shall now argue that B4 is an infelicitous choice even for a model of the positive 
catuskoti: B4 is unable to meet the exclusivity and exhaustivity constraint. I shall first 
address two concerns that one might have with B4 and motivate a plausible reply to 
those on behalf of Cotnoir. This is not to say that those responses are the only worth 
considering - there may as well be better responses. Maybe even responses that would 
suppress the collapse-argument that I will put forward. Nevertheless, I take my 
responses on behalf of Cotnoir to be the most natural and obvious.  
 
First Concern: Classical Operators 
 
B4 works with the classical operators, and as we saw in the discussion in §1, the 
classical operators lack the expressive power to meet the exclusivity/exhaustivity 
constraint. Priest (2010) introduces the ideas of several commentators who have tried 
to meet the constraint with the apparatuses of classical logic. I have mentioned 
Westerhoff’s approach, who tries to avoid the collapse of the kotis by resorting to 
different types of negation. Priest’s concerns remain pressing, and the move to 
paraconsistency seems appropriate. This shall not mean that the debate is settled, or 
that any formulation of the catuskoti with (slightly altered) classical operators is 
ultimately going to fail, or that other non-classical logic (such as relevant-logic) 
cannot be successfully employed.  But since those matters are contentious, I want to 
highlight the most obvious reply at this point – just to return to them later in my own 
proposal.  
  Since we know that adding a set of status-predicates to FDE does satisfying work, 
we can try adding status-principles to B4. The corners of the B4-lattice get assigned 
their corresponding status-predicate13: B=(1,1), T=(1,0), F=(0,1), N=(0,0). I take this 
to be the most compelling way to introduce status predicates. Call the resulting logic 
‘B4S’. This move has one downside: the status-predicates cannot reflect the levels of 
reality we find in the suggested metaphysics in the way the ordered pairs do. But, this 
is no surprise as we already know that B4 is not the right logic for the (as often 
interpreted) ontologically-loaded negative catuskoti. Anyways, we can try to include 
the distinction into metaphysical realms of reality in our model: one way to introduce 
status-predicates to B4 which seems natural if one wants to reflect the different levels 
of reality is this,  
 
(1,1) = (TC, FU) 
(1,0) = (TC, ¬  FU) 
                                                
13 See TABLE 5 
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(0,1) = (FC, FU) 
(0,0) = (FC, ¬  FU) 
 
where the indexed C reflects conventional reality, and the indexed U reflects ultimate 
reality14. 
  The problem here is that, as far as common interpretation of Buddhist texts goes, 
it is only the conventional type of truth that language can express. Whatever happens 
in ultimate reality, and hence also the truth- and falsehood about ultimate reality, 
remains ineffable. If this is right, whatever kind of metalinguistic status-predicate we 
use for Cotnoir’s ordered pairs, it reduces to a statement about conventional reality, 
and if so, cannot express the four corners of the catuskoti – it would reduce to TC and 
FC. This is in effect the criticism that the Tsongkhapa interpretation that we have 
looked at above is facing, too.  
   One resort would be to hold that we can have a status predicate for ultimate 
reality, but that it cannot be used to speak truly or falsely, but that it only expressed 
things of the form NU(A)15. The worry here is the same as above: such a combination 
of status-predicates is only capable of expressing two possibilities, (TC, NU) and (FC, 
NU). Hence, the only way to introduce a metalinguistic status-predicate for Cotnoir’s 
ordered pair is by taking the ordered pair to be a conjoint claim: “A is conventionally 
true and ultimately not false” which is reflected in the ordered pair (1,0) and will be 
expressed with the status-predicate T. 
  Assessing the first proposal: the move has the down-side of not reflecting the 
levels of reality we find in the suggested metaphysics in the way the ordered pair 
does. Nevertheless, I take the first concern concerning the classical operators to be 
alleviated. It is, as we see in FDE, not necessary to reflect the metaphysics in the way 
the ordered pair does. Moreover, the metaphysics on which Cotnoir is referring itself 
springs from a contentious interpretation of ancient texts as the quotes above suggest.  
 
Second Concern: Transparency 
 
The truth-predicate !  in FDE(S), as Priest defines it, satisfies the unrestricted T-
schema – i.e. it is transparent. A transparent truth predicate !  is one that, paired with 
some quotation device ‘[]’, allows for any well-formed-formula !  , for the claim !(#)  
to be substituted for A or vice versa, in all extensional contexts, in all arguments 
without change in validity.  
 !"#$%&#'(&$)	+--(ℎ$/0	(!+):	+[5] ↔ 5  
 
One could argue that transparency of the truth-predicate is something that Nāgārjuna 
would not have endorsed. Priest explicitly addresses this thought: 
 
                                                
14 Thanks to Aaron Cotnoir for suggesting this assignment of status-predicates. 
15 We find such a proposal in Priest (2010: 24) 
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I do not know of any Indian textual sources that endorse this [the unrestricted T-schema], 
but it seems so natural and obvious that it is plausible that it was taken for granted. In 
Western philosophy, it has been problematized by paradoxes such as the Liar. But, again 
as far as I know, there is no awareness of these in early Indian philosophy. (Priest 2010) 
 
The unrestricted T-Schema has been problematized by paradoxes of self-reference 
since, together with classical logic, via the principle of explosion, it leads into 
trivialism – the claim that everything is true. In other words: any arbitrary statement 
is equivalent to its own truth-predication. In the case of the catuskoti, we would suffer 
collapse of the kotis if our logic is classical (as B4S is) and the truth-predicate 
transparent (which it most probably is, as well, if it inherits the status-predicates from 
FDE(S)). To see this, follow the subsequent reasoning: 
 !"#$%&#'(&$)	+--(ℎ$/0:															+[3] ↔ 3  !"#$%&'"()$)"#:																																¬-[/] ↔ ¬/  !"#$%&#'(&$)	+--(ℎ$/0																+[¬3] ↔ ¬3  !"#$%&'&(&')																																										![¬-] ↔ ¬![-]  
 
If this reasoning is right, the second koti ! " ∧ ¬%(")   is equivalent to ! " ∧ ¬%(")  , which is ! ¬# ∧ ! ¬#   , which is ! " .  The same happens with !(#).  Since we have defined the third koti as ! " ∧ $ "   , it is obvious that koti (3) 
collapses into koti (1) and (2) again. Moreover, koti (4) is equivalent to koti (3). The 
catuskoti suffers complete collapse. The price one has to pay for an unrestricted T-
schema is the replacement of the classical biconditional with a non-contrapossible 
non-classical one. Priest avoids the problem by going non-classical. The biconditional 
in FDE(S) is not contrapossible, it thus avoids the collapse of the kotis.  
   Since B4 is classical, semantically closed, and (to make sense of the 
exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint), inherits the transparent truth-predicate from 
FDE(S), it leads to trivialism. This is indeed an unacceptable consequence, but a very 
obvious one16.  
  However, let this not be the end of the story for B4. It does not have to be 
irrevocable that an unrestricted T-schema plays havoc with classical logic. New 
developments, named Strict–Tolerant Conception of Truth17, introduce a transparent 
truth-predicate which does not lead to trivialism in a classical framework. It might 
also be possible to introduce a set of status-predicates with a restricted T-schema – 
i.e. with an opaque truth-predicate18. The advocate of the latter position would have to 
tell a story about paradoxes of self-reference, but I don’t want to rule out such a 
                                                
16 Which is why we might question whether the MMK requires accepting transparent truth. Indeed, 
there is perhaps nothing in the MMK itself that requires transparent truth, but it is such a plausible idea 
that there is nothing in the MMK that would speak against it. In fact, it doesn’t really matter, the 
collapse argument I shall put forward doesn’t rely on it, as a later point will show. Again, I have to 
thank Aaron Cotnoir for pointing this out.  
17 See Cobreros, Egre, Ripley, van Rooij (2013), inter alia.  
18 Which will also help with the ‘just truth’ and ‘just falsity’. 
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position on a priori grounds. Cotnoir is not committed to transparency, so I take 
either one to be a promising option for B4S. If one of those proposals is fruitful, one 
might expect the concerns to be alleviated – B4 must not lead to trivialism. Let me 
now show that even with an opaque truth-predicate, or ‘tamed’ T-schema, B4S cannot 
meet the exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint.  
 
Third Concern: Collapse 
 
Let us assume that we have introduced a non-transparent truth-predicate by restricting 
the T-schema, or a transparent truth-predicate which does not lead to trivialism in a 
classical framework. Moreover, as we are in classical logic, assume double negation ¬¬" ≡ "  and monotonicity ! " 	∧ ! " ≡ ! " .  ! "   entails ¬" #   . To see this, 
remember that by the (restricted) T-schema, the truth-condition for ![¬$]  to be 
designated needs ¬"  to be designated, too. Since we are in classical logic, it follows 
that !  is not designated. Since ¬" # ≡ % #   ,  ! "   must be f, since negation toggles 
f and t, and ¬"[$]  must be t. To make this graphic, see that, if we are working in a 
bivalent framework, ! ¬# $%&¬![#  ] are equivalent: 
 
 
                                                              ![¬$] ≡ ¬![$]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If this reasoning is correct, we again suffer collapse of the catuskoti.  
 
 
Koti1:  ! " = ! " ∧	¬' "    ≡  			" # 	∧ ¬¬" # 	  ≡     !(#)  
Koti2: 	" # = " # ∧	¬' #     ≡   ¬" # ∧ ¬"(#)	  ≡	¬$ %   
Koti3: 	" # = % # ∧ 	' #       ≡   ! "   ∧	¬$(&)  
Koti4: 	" # = ¬& # ∧	¬( #   ≡   ¬"($) ∧	¬¬" $   ≡  	¬# $ ∧ #($)  
  
  We take the kotis as defined in Priest (2010) on the left side of the equation sign. 
To formulate the ‘just-truth’ of the first, and the ‘just-falsity’ of the second koti, a 
conjunct is added (¬" #   in the case of the first koti, ¬" #   in the case of the 
second), to guarantee the exclusivity of the first two kotis. Assuming double-
negation, which is unproblematic in classical logic, we can reformulate ¬" #   as ¬¬" #   , eliminating the double-negation, we get 			" # 	∧ " #   . Assuming 
T F 
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monotonicity, which is also unproblematic, we can reformulate the first koti 
as	" # 	  – which, for now, is just fine. For koti (2), we write	" # 	  as ¬" # .	  This is 
unproblematic, since negation works classically, ‘just-falsity’ is nothing but ‘un-
truth’. Again, have a look at the quadrants above. If !   and !  exhaust all the 
possibilities, !  is in the right box, such as ¬".  Assuming monotonicity, we formulate 
the second koti as ¬" #   . The right side of the equation is thus how Cotnoir would 
formulate the kotis in classical bivalent logic. To continue, we also reformulate ! "   
in koti (3) as ¬" # .  The first conjunct remains unchanged. In koti (4), we write ¬" #   , assuming double-negation, as	¬¬# $   , eliminate the double-negation, and 
are left with ! " .  The first conjunct remains unchanged. 
  What should be apparent now is that the fourth koti is equivalent to the third 
koti. Both entail koti (1) and (2). This is, koti (3) and (4) are redundant. The classical 
framework of Cotnoir’s proposal has the collapse of the kotis as a consequence. The 
positive catuskoti cannot reasonably be formulated in B4S because the status-
predicates do not work in a classical framework. Returning to FDE(S) would thus be 
an obvious rejoinder. But if we still take Cotnoir’s recapture-concerns seriously, we 
are back to square one – but not if we change our view on what role the catuskoti 
plays in Nagarjuna's philosophy. 
 
6. IS THERE REALLY A RECAPTURE PROBLEM? 
 
There is a way to return to FDE(S), without facing Cotnoir's problem, if we stop 
thinking about the catuskoti (and its logic) as providing the basis of the relation of 
logical consequence for Nagarjuna, and (as does Graham Priest, as confirmed in 
correspondence) think about the catuskoti simply as the basis of the Madhyamaka 
metaphysics19. Cotnoir assumes that the catuskoti is Nagarjuna's basis of the relation 
of logical consequence, and that is why FDE(S) has the weakness it has. Let this be 
the first way to counter Cotnoir's recapture problem. 
   Moreover, the catuskoti has some interesting ramifications on common the 
response to the recapture problem in the study of paraconsitent logic that make the 
recapture problem disappear and reveal, taking into account the Madhyamaka 
ontology in the background, where Cotnoir's argument against the formulation of the 
catuskoti in FDE(S) goes wrong. 
  As we now know, taking the material conditional as the conditional is an 
infelicitous choice for the FDE-ist. Cotnoir himself briefly considers using use the 
FDE-lattice (with additional resources) as a basis for a relevant conditional. The 
relevant conditional is known to solve some of the issues with classical inferences as 
it could be constructed to validate modus ponens, modus tollens, and hypothetical 
syllogism, but, makes it difficult to model restricted quantification, due to the strength 
                                                
19 In the same way, the PNC and PEM are metaphysical principles of Aristotle, and his account of 
logical consequence (syllogistic) is quite independent of this. Thanks to Graham Priest for making me 
aware of this. 
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of the conditional. Hence, Cotnoir is right to dismiss this idea. He quotes a case of 
restricted quantification in the MMK: 
 
Whatever is deceptive is false. Compounded phenomena are all deceptive. Therefore, 
they are all false. (MMK 13.1) 
 
One way of getting around the recapture problem is Priest's Methodological Maxim 
(1987:8.4), which, applied to FDE, suggest taking material detachment (i.e. modus 
ponens), and, more generally, classically valid inferences that are not valid in FDE as 
acceptable “default inferences”, calling them quasi-valid inferences. As we saw in 
Cotnoir's counterexample to modus ponens, these inferences arise only when truth-
value gluts (i.e. b) or truth-value gluts (i.e. n) occur in the reasoning. Given that, as 
Priest holds, in vernacular reasoning such things are rare (statistically uncommon), 
they come with a low a priori probability of obtaining. The idea is now that we are 
justified in reasoning classically on the assumption that we are neither dealing with 
gluts, nor gaps. In ordinary discourse, this is certainly a plausible maxim. 
  Given some usual cat, we are entitled to assume that is has four legs, if we have 
no reason to think otherwise, or we (at some point) learn otherwise. The same 
epistemic principle applies to reasoning: If we reason about a situation, we are 
entitled to think that it is consistent, until we learn otherwise. The belief that the cat 
has four legs is therefore fallible, as the belief that a given situation or concept is 
consistent. That is, we may have Σ ⊢ #  but Σ ∪ Π ⊬ %  . Fallibility due to new 
information (Π  ) is, then, built into the very notion of logical consequence. Does this 
strategy work for Nagarjuna? 
  It does, but surprisingly not for epistemic, but metaphysical reasons: Taking the 
underlying metaphysics into account, and the ultimate aim of the MMK, which is to 
establish the lack of svahbava in quite a lot of concepts, we realise that for Nagarjuna, 
it is the inconsistent situation which is the default position (at least from ultimate 
reality). Nagarjuna, in fact, has a maximally high a priori probability for dealing with 
inconsistent concepts in ordinary reasoning, other than the ones we find in "ordinary” 
logico-mathematical contexts: Change and motion, for example, are inconsistent 
concepts, according to the MMK. But, if both change and motion are dialethia (i.e. 
have the truth-value (b), both premises and the conclusion in the instance of the 
MMK that Cotnoir took to establish the recapture problem are designated, since ! =	 $, & 	  - „When there is change, there is motion. Since there is change in the 
moving, motion is in that which is moving.” (MMK 2.2) aka. modus ponens: A⊃B, 
A⊨B is thus valid in FDE(S). 
  What went wrong in Cotnoir’s argument? The truth-value assignment v(A)= b 
and v(B)= f, which makes Modus Ponens:(¬A∨B), A⊨B invalid in FDE(S), is an (in 
the context of the MMK) impossible truth-value assignment. But now, we can argue 
whether v(A)= b and v(B)= b is an adequate truth-value assignment. As the MMK is 
not trying to establish that the concepts in question are pure dialethias, but that they 
lack svahbava (i.e. are empty) the only plausible truth-value assignment for all the 
concepts in the MMK is (e), and hence for the modus ponens above the truth-value 
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assignment must be v(A)= e and v(B)= e. Whether the modus ponens above is valid, 
then, hinges on the status of the fifth truth-value (e). In the semantics above, (e) is not 
member of the set of designated values, and as validity is defined as the preservation 
of designated values, all reasoning that includes empty concepts (such as the modus 
ponens above) in invalid. However, in all the arguments with empty concepts that we 
see in the MMK, we have a preservation of (e). What to make of this, I do not know. I 
am inclined to think about it as telling us that reasoning is itself empty and lacks 
svahbava, but I shall leave this to scholars to debate. At least, it is now questionable 
whether there has ever been a recapture problem, at all. 
  But what if we are unsatisfied by a paraconsitent/ paracomplete treatment of the 
catuskoti for other reasons – let them be doctrinal. Can there really be no formulation 
in classical terms? I shall now suggest a formulation of the catuskoti that I, given the 
philosophical milieu in which the catuskoti has been predominantly employed, find 
very compelling.  
 
7. B4Sx – A PROPOSAL 
 
Let this not be the end of the story. What we are seeking is an adequate formulation 
of the catuskoti within a logic in which the crucial inference rules are valid, which 
avoids trivialism, but does not make the kotis collapse into one another. The logic that 
I am proposing here is a four-valued Boolean Algebra with the already familiar set of 
status-predicates. The clue is that negation is an illocutionary act20. 
 
Negation as a Speech-Act 
 
Remember that in Westerhoff (2009: 4) we find a different type of negation for koti 
(4), such that koti (3) is no more deducible from (4). Priest (2010) argues that the 
“negation-move” is somewhat ad hoc, and while it works for kotis (1-3), it cannot 
work for koti (4). If we could find a way to implement Westerhoff’s analysis of 
negation into B4, such that koti (3) is no more equivalent to koti (4) and neither of 
them entails koti (1) and koti (2), we could resist the collapse while staying classical. 
  Let us first define the behaviour of the external (prasaja) negation '×'  , and its 
relation to classical negation '¬'  :
 ×  does not toggle anything 
Neither does ¬  entail ×  , nor ×  does not entail ¬  
Double-negation elimination does not hold for ××  
Double negation elimination does neither hold for ×¬  nor ¬×  
 ×  is considered an illocutionary negation: the speech act of ‘denial’21 
                                                
20 Illocutionary negation (denial, or denegation) has been defined in Searle (1969). 
21 We thereby extend the notion of the presupposition-cancelling (prasaja) negation to a more general 
notion, as denial (as a speech-act) can do more than merely cancelling a proposition, e.g. express a lack 
of evidence or understanding. See Searle (1969: 31-33). 
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While the first points characterize the behaviour of the external negation, the last 
point is the most important for the following discussion. Mohanata (2009) and 
Westerhoff (2009) mention the concept of prasajya pratisedha as a non-relational 
negation, corresponding to the modern notion of denegation, or illocutionary 
negation. I follow them and take the prajasa-negation to be a speech act, the speech-
act of ‘denial’. This is plausible, since a denial works, just as the external negation, on 
the sentential level and is likewise not presupposition-preserving.  
  It has been suggested that instead of “shrieking”, one could “whisper” to regain 
classicality in paraconsitent contexts22. The glut theorist could express classicality by 
way of conversational implicature. Working with B4S, we don’t need to regain 
classicality. Nevertheless, the core idea is interesting: propositions containing a 
content can be pre-fixed with an illocutionary operator. One motivation is that using 
the external negation as an illocutionary act lets us reject the presupposition made by 
the proposition to be negated. Another motivation is that it corresponds to our 
epistemic situation in a number of cases. Sometimes we plainly lack the crucial 
evidence which would make a proposition either true or false, decisively. Certain 
concepts (perhaps all) the catuskoti, as a prasanga argument, is applied to in the 
MMK may be of this kind.  
  Negation as a speech act of denial, regardless of how one accounts for it, can only 
be restricted to negation of propositions, as, from a semantic viewpoint, in 
conversations, we do not deny any constituent smaller than a proposition. Or at least 
if we disagree with some part of a sentence, it would not be expressed as a simple 
negation qua a speech act of denial, but as an expression of disagreement23. In my 
proposal, I take the illocutionary act to work on the level of truth- and falsity-
assignments, expressing a quasi-proposition which reads “… the truth of A”. The 
illocutionary act of denial would hence read “I deny (the truth of A/ that the truth of 
A obtains)”. This reflects in the argumentative framework of the dialogs between 
teacher and student in the Buddhist literature, employing the catuskoti, presenting it 
with speech-acts, as a prasanga argument. Take the following passage, the translation 
in Radhakrishnan and Moore (1957: 28) of a conversation between Gotama and an 
interlocutor about the existence of the Tathagata24 (saint) after death. The prominent 
feature of this conversation is that every truth-assignment or falsity-assignment of the 
existence of the saint after death is proceeded by an immediate act of denial (in other 
dialogs, by affirmation). 
 
 V1: How is it, Gotama? Does Gotama hold that the saint exists after death, 
                                                
22 See, inter alia, Sharpio (2004), Priest (2006). 
23 Thanks to Ahmad Jabbar for pressing this point. 
24 There is no onus in the translation of the sanskrit word. It is often thought to mean either "one who 
has thus gone" (tathā-gata) or "one who has thus come" (tathā-āgata). Maybe here is a ‘neither’ or 
‘both’ assignment at work too. The Tathagata would thus be the one beyond coming and going, the one 
who has passed the world of transitory phenomena. Perhaps, the catuskoti is supposed to express that.  
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  and that this view alone is true, and every other false?  
 G1: Nay, Vacca. I do not hold that the saint exists after death,  
 and that this view alone is true, and every other false.  
 V2: How is it, Gotama? Does Gotama hold that the saint does not exist after death,  
 and that this view alone is true, and every other false?  
 G2: Nay, Vacca. I do not hold that the saint does not exist after death,  
 and that this view alone is true, and every other false.  
 V3: How is it, Gotama? Does Gotama hold that the saint both exists and does not exist 
 after death,  
 and that this view alone is true, and every other false?  
 G3: Nay, Vacca. I do not hold that the saint both exists and does not exist after death,  
 and that this view alone is true, and every other false.  
 V4: How is it, Gotama? Does Gotama hold that the saint neither exists nor does not 
 exist after death, 
  and that this view alone is true, and every other false?  
 G4: Nay, Vacca. I do not hold that the saint neither exists nor does not exist after death,  
 and that this view alone is true, and every other false. 
 
It is obvious that the Buddha does not give four answers to four questions, he is rather 
denying that he beliefs in any of those possibilities. This belief could be expressed 
doxastically, but since we are not concerned with what the Buddha beliefs, but what 
the Buddha asserts or denies, I take the illocutionary route to be more promising. The 
act of not-asserting (holding) must hence be equivalent to the act of denying. 
  This proposal comes with a number of challenges – those that we have 
encountered already (recapture, collapse and the exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint) 
plus some that are specific to this formulation: 
  First Challenge: Priest (2010) is right in making explicit that appeal to speech 
acts inside propositional contexts is pointless. The first koti formulated with the 
illocutionary negation of the second conjunct 	" ∧	×¬"  in a logic without status-
predicates does not make sense. Taking the second koti as one proposition, we have, 
by this formulation, a speech-act as a part of the content of the proposition, but this is 
not how a speech-acts work. The same goes for the second koti. For my proposal to 
be successful, this has to be avoided. Let this be the first challenge. 
  Second Challenge: On Westerhoff’s account, ¬"  entails ×"  , as thoroughly 
explained in §1. ‘The bird is not a crane” entails ‘It is not the case that this bird is a 
crane, but not vice versa. If this is so, the fourth koti, formulated as × " ∨ ¬"   ,
cannot hold. !   cannot both hold and fail to hold. The fourth koti must have an 
intelligible formulation in B4Sx  
  Third Challenge: Although it shall not be decisive, it would be of advantage if the 
proposed logic could, unlike its friend B4, accommodate the negative catuskoti as 
well. 
 
The Catuskoti in B4Sx 
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A logic built on B4, which has the status-predicates, and the illocutionary negation as 
a supplemented operator will be called B4Sx. As already mentioned, there is no direct 
textual evidence that there are two different negations at work in the catuskoti. Yet, I 
take Westerhoff’s (2010) considerations that the catuskoti and the negations therein 
have been be convincing. But, since every negation in the catuskoti is potentially 
ambiguous, I will formulate the catuskoti with the illocutionary negation only. 
Regarding the fact that the most common use of the catuskoti is within a 
conversational setting, the idea of exclusively utilizing illocutionary acts in a 
modelling seems reasonable to me. The suggested formulation of the catuskoti in 
B4Sx is the following: 
 
Positive Catuskoti 1.0 
Koti 1: ! " = ! " ∧	×' "   
Koti 2:	" # = " # ∧	×' #   
Koti 3:	" # = % # ∧ 	' #   
Koti 4:	" # =	×& # ∧	×( #   
 
To formulate the negative catuskoti, I take the denial of all the alternatives to be 
expressible by a speech-act as well. Let this speech-act be ‘silence’, or more 
appropriate to the Madhyamika context; ‘ineffability’, expressed by the ⊗ -#$%&'(#&  , which denies the existence of ‘svabhava’ for what is presupposed in 
the kotis: call it the !"#$%&%-()*+%&(+  . It is important to note that ‘silence’ itself 
doesn’t classify as a speech act, albeit a form of communication. It is not literal 
silence about !  , as in not talking where talk is expected. What the ' ⊗'  is supposed to 
express is a statement about the ineffability (being silent about) of the status of !  . We 
want to apply the	⊗ -$%&'()$'  to	"  whenever !  is not part of our language, this is, 
whenever it exceeds the conventional realm, and with it conceptual language and 
thought. There is a significant strand of the Buddhist tradition that explicitly asserts 
that claims about ultimate reality are beyond language25, hence, we do not want to 
assert something about ultimate reality, so I define ' ⊗ '  in terms of '×'  , denying 
assertions about the truth or falsehood of !  . By denying ! "   and denying the denial 
of ! "   , one does not affirm ! "   or ! "   , but remains silent about it. 
 
 Negative Catuskoti 1.0 
 Koti 1: ⊗" # =	×	(" # ∧	×) # )  
                                                
25 In the Indian Buddhist tradition, there is a lively debate about the question whether such statements 
as "everything is empty" or "nothing exists by svabhāva" are correct expressions of (parts of) ultimate 
reality. I take it to be a plausible interpretation of the MMK, and shall refrain from going into detail on 
this discussion. This might have the downside that my model for the catuskoti only works in the 
context of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Even more so, saying that ultimate reality is (always) beyond 
language and thought, and that statements about ultimate reality are ineffable is in the context of 
Chinese Buddhist philosophy and its derivatives certainly contentious. Dogen, for example, literally 
denies the ineffability of ultimate reality, and so does much of Tientai thought. Thanks to Jan 
Westerhoff for pressing the former point, and an anonymous referee for pressing latter. 
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 Koti 2:	⊗ # $ =	×	(# $ ∧	×) $ )  
 Koti 3:	⊗ # $ =	×	(( $ ∧ 	* $ )  
 Koti 4:	⊗ # $ =	×	(×( $ ∧	×* $ )  
 
One important note on the semantics for those speech acts: illocutionary acts are not 
part of the content of a sentence, but indicate the force with which a sentence is 
uttered. It therefore makes no sense to embed a sentence with a prefixed force 
operator within a more complex sentence, as we have discussed it before. However, 
in defining ' ⊗ '   above, I regularly do embed a sentence with a prefixed force 
operator within a more complex sentence. What is to make of this? We have to tweak 
speech-act theory a little here, to make sense of this formulation: 
  As we are in a conversational setting, and it is not uncommon that in a 
conversational setting things one has affirmed or denied earlier are taken back, 
corrected, or emphasized. We can think of an emphasis, for example, as a speech-act 
which governs over speech-acts one has performed earlier, without performing the 
speech-act again, but simply by referring to it. The earlier speech-act the manifesting 
speech-act is referring to is not a force in its own right anymore, but has taken a 
propositional form which can be prefixed with a force operator (e.g. emphasis). The 
same thing happens in the formulation of the negative catuskoti with the ⊗ -#$%&'(#&  . The denial which is embedded in the complex sentence and prefixed 
with the illocutionary act of denial has lost its force and illocutionary power, but can 
still be referred to, without being "illocutionarily" effective. Let us formulate the 
ineffective illocutionary act of denial as ×  ineffective, and we can model the negative 
catuskoti without the obscure use of speech-acts inside speech-acts. 
 
 Negative Catuskoti 2.0 
 Koti 1: ⊗" # =	×	(" # ∧	×  ineffective	" # )  
 Koti 2:	⊗ # $ =	×	(# $ ∧	×  ineffective ! " )  
 Koti 3:	⊗ # $ =	×	(( $ ∧ 	* $ )  
 Koti 4:	⊗ # $ =	×	(×  ineffective ! " ∧	×  ineffective ! " )  
 
It is important to note that ' ⊗'  is not a mere rejection. It is tempting to interpret the 
negative catuskoti as a rejection of all possibilities, but Nagarjuna thinks that 
everything is empty of self-being (svahbava), which is not the same as a simple denial 
of the self-being. It is not as though every statement about ultimate reality has to be 
rejected – Nagarjuna wasn’t a mystic. See what MMK XXIV: 18 tells us: 
 
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen  
 That is explained to be emptiness.  
 That, being a dependent designation,  
 Is itself the middle way.  
 
Interpret “That is explained to be emptiness” as ascribing ‘emptiness’ to something in 
a positive illocutionary act of ascribing all the possibilities of the catuskoti a further 
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status, which is distinct from ! " ∨ $ " ∨ % " ∨ & " .  But to do that, all the 
possibilities have to be (implicitly) denied. Where Priest (2010) adds another status-
predicate (E), I interpret the affirmation of ‘emptiness’ as an illusionary act which 
denies all ! " ∨ $ " ∨ % " ∨ & "   and by that ascribes ' ⊗'  to them. Hence, the 
illocutionary act, expressed by ' ⊗ '  is both a (implicit) denial (of all the kotis) and an 
(explicit) affirmation (of emptiness). This behaviour of ' ⊗ '  is perfectly captured by 
a speech-act, albeit an unconventional one26, which thus reads “I explicitly affirm the 
emptiness (sunyata) of !  and implicitly deny the self-being (svahbava) of !. "  
 !"#$%&%'	)*+%,$	-.	,$$	/-'%0:⊗ 3 4 ∨ 6 4 ∨ 7 4 ∨ 8 4   ≡	  !"#$%&%'	)**%+,)'%-.	-*	!,#'%./00 ⊗ (3)  
 
The illocutionary acts create a (non-gappy or glutty) bivalence of acceptance/or 
denial and, to make this more apparent, one could read the positive catuskoti 
alternatively with an assertion-operator ' ⋕ '  which, pace Searle (1969), stand for the 
assertive illocutionary act. ⋕ "($)   reads “I assert that ! " . "	  The ⋕  -operator is 
redundant in this case, but nevertheless its behaviour can be defined: 
 ⋕  doesn’t toggle anything. ⋕  does iterate. 
Double-affirmation elimination holds for ⋕⋕  .⋕×	$ℎ&'	×  , but not ×⋕ #ℎ%&	×  .⋕  is interpreted as an illocutionary affirmation  
 
Positive Catuskoti 2.0 
Koti 1: ! " =⋕ ! " ∧	×( "   
Koti 2:	" # =⋕ " # ∧	×( #   
Koti 3:	" # =⋕ (' # ∧ 	) # )  
Koti 4:	" # =× & # ∧ ( # .	  
 
Regarding Recapture 
 
First of all, note that B4Sx is fully classical with respect to the crucial inference rules, 
as we are in Four-Valued Boolean Algebra. The illocutionary operators do not 
                                                
26 One might wonder here, if speech-acts do really work in this way. The problem is that illocutionary 
acts are not part of the content of a sentence, but indicate the force with which a sentence is 
uttered. There is, so orthodox speech-act theory, no force that corresponds to 'explicitly affirmation the 
emptiness and implicitly deny the self-being'. Thanks to Graham Priest for pointing this comment. This 
observation is certainly correct, but as orthodox speech-act theory most probably doesn't include the 
illocutory forces of ancient India, and we can guess that statements about emptiness have an 
exceptional status, let us just think of ⊗   as an illocution, and let us think that there is a corresponding 
force.  
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interfere with modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, or any other 
classical inference rule which we can find in the MMK since there is no entailment 
from '¬'  to '×'  , or '×'  to '¬'  . We can say that Cotnoir’s recapture problem seems to 
be solved. Let us now verify that B4Sx can also ground the logic for the catuskoti, 
without collapse. 
 
Regarding the Exclusivity/Exhaustivity Constraint 
 
Regarding the first two kotis: To express the ‘just-truth’ and ‘just-falsity’ of the first 
two kotis, the respective dual is negated with the illocutionary negation '×'.  Having a 
status-predicate governing our proposition we have left the propositional context. It 
thus makes sense to formulate the kotis in that way. In the case of the first koti it 
states the truth of !  , and denies the falsity of !  , which is just like stating the just-truth 
of !  . The same goes for the ‘just-falsity’ in koti (2). It says that the falsity of !  
obtains, while the truth of !  does not.  
  Regarding the last koti: I take ×" # ∧	×& #   to be a natural formulation of the 
not-obtaining of neither the truth nor the falsity of !.  Whereas to assert that it is not 
the case that !  does hold and does not hold does not make sense, it makes good sense 
to assert that neither the truth nor the falsity of !  , while making no statement about 
the ontological nature of !  itself. The last koti makes good sense in this formulation.  
 
Regarding Collapse 
 
The kotis in B4Sx do not collapse. !"#$%&'"()$)"#:	×-[/] ↔×/   is not valid in 
B4Sx. To deny truth of !  does not imply denying that !  does not obtain at all, the 
same goes for the other direction. ! ×# 	%&	'()	*+,%-./*')	)(	×! #   , since	" ×$   ,
as I have formulated it, doesn’t make sense – the ×  -operator works on the level of 
truth-predicates only. Neither is	" ¬$ 	%&'()*+%,-	-.	×" $   , since ×" #   leaves 
open the possibility that !  does obtain, while ! ¬#   does not allow for this 
possibility. Again, this is because '×'  , as I construe it, works in the metalanguage of 
truth-predicates, and '¬'  in the object language.  
  In the light of the aforementioned, we can see why the catuskoti does not collapse 
in B4Sx. The first koti ! " ∧	×& "   is equivalent to ! " ∧	×¬! "   . Since 
double-negation elimination does not hold for '×¬',  we cannot reduce the first koti to ! "   . The transformation stops there. The second koti ! " ∧	×& "   is equivalent to ! " ∧	×¬! " .  We cannot reduce this to ! "   for the same reason. The 
transformation stops there. The fourth koti ×" # ∧	×& #    is equivalent to ×¬# $ ∧	×¬' $   , and the third koti ! " ∧ 	% "    is equivalent to ¬" # ∧	¬& #   , but neither is ×¬# $ ∧	×¬' $   equivalent to, nor does it entail ¬" # ∧	¬& # .  The former denies the not-obtaining of the truth and falsity of	",  
the latter, which could be read with an ⋕  -operator, asserts the obtaining of both the 
truth and the falsity of 	"   - two very different things. Form neither 
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×¬# $ ∧	×¬' $ ,   nor ¬" # ∧	¬& #    we can entail ! " ∧	×¬! "    or ! " ∧	×¬! " .  The catuskoti does not collapse! 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
We have seen several attempts to find a logic for the catuskoti with classical 
operators. Priest has argued that none of those formulations is adequate. He suggested 
FDE(S) as the logic for the positive catuskoti, and FDE(e) for the negative. Cotnoir 
challenged FDE(S) with the classical recapture problem. As it turned out, Cotnoir’s 
suggested logic (even if drastically altered) makes the catuskoti collapse as well. 
Taking his concerns seriously, I have introduced a natural extension of Cotnoir’s 
proposal which builds on the idea of treating the negations in the catuskoti as an 
(unorthodox) speech-act. With this semantics, the recapture problem is alleviated and 
a collapse of the four corners of the catuskoti is successfully avoided.   
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